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 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ensures that no person shall 
be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”1  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held this to require that all criminal defendants be found guilty 
only when guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.2  The requirement of the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard—the highest evidentiary burden in our legal 
system—is often attributed to “a fundamental value determination of our society that 
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than let a guilty man go free.”3  Our 
criminal system presumes innocence and by embracing the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard, disproving innocence is an extremely difficult task, and for good 
reason.  However, the current sentencing guidelines, which provide guidance to the 
federal judiciary in issuing criminal sentences, endorse a practice that allows 
individuals to be punished for crimes for which they have never been convicted.
 Sean Michael Grier is a victim of this loophole.  He was charged with a single 
crime.4  He pled guilty to a single crime.5  He was convicted of a single crime.6  Yet 
the length of his current prison sentence is based on a court’s finding that he 
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional 
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
3. Justice Harlan emphasized that the requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in proving a 
criminal charge, “ref lect[s] a very fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous 
factual determinations.”  Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan explained that the fact-
finder in a judicial proceeding is never able to make a determination of fact based on actual knowledge, 
but rather his or her determination of fact is made on beliefs based on the evidence presented.  Id.  It 
therefore follows that “the trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in his factual 
conclusions.”  Id.  The frequency of factually erroneous determinations is thus inf luenced by the burden 
of persuasion used in proving criminal guilt, and therefore embracing the highest evidentiary standard 
in making this determination ref lects a core societal value.  Id. at 372; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is the duty of the Government to establish . . . 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  This notion—basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free 
society—is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of due 
process.”); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (stating the beyond a reasonable doubt 
requirement is implicit in “constitutions . . . [that] recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed 
essential for the protection of life and liberty”).
4. Grier was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), possession of a stolen firearm, but the charge 
was dropped pursuant to his plea agreement.  See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 559 (3d Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3159 (2007).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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committed two separate crimes.7  Under the current United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”),8 this practice has been deemed permissible.9
 In United States v. Grier, the defendant Grier pled guilty to being a convicted 
felon in possession of a firearm,10 a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).11  At sentencing 
the court imposed a four-level sentence enhancement12 pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)
(5) of the U.S.S.G.13 based on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence,14 rather 
than beyond a reasonable doubt,15 that the appellant had committed a felony offense 
7. Id. at 559–60.
8. The U.S.S.G. provides an advisory basis for the majority of sentences issued by federal courts.  Grier, 
475 F.3d at 560 (recognizing “that the Guidelines were advisory . . . ”); United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).  In Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, the Court in Booker held that, as applied, 
the U.S.S.G. was unconstitutional, and instead held that the guidelines must instead be advisory. 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 145–46 (“We conclude that this provision must be severed and excised, as must one 
other statutory section, § 3742(e) . . . , which depends upon the Guidelines’ mandatory nature.  So 
modified, the federal sentencing statute, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 . . . as amended, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq., makes the Guidelines effectively advisory.  It requires a sentencing 
court to consider Guidelines ranges . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other 
statutory concerns as well . . . .”).
9. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2007).
10. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for
   any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year; to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
12. While the enhancement associated with this finding was a four-level increase, the court also granted a 
two-level downward departure based on the assault victim’s partial responsibility for the assault at issue. 
See Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.
13. The enhancement was based on what was then U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), but what is now U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(6), which states:
   If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another 
felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, 
intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another 
felony offense, increase by 4 levels.  If the resulting offense level is less than level 18, 
increase to level 18.
 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2007).
14. The “by a preponderance of the evidence” standard is a lower evidentiary burden than the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard associated with determinations of guilt.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th 
ed. 2004) (citing Charles Herman Kinnane, A First Book on Anglo-American Law 562 (2d ed. 
1952) (defining “preponderance of the evidence” as “the greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily 
established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most 
convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from 
all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather 
than the other.”)).
15. In criminal cases the prosecution is required to prove all elements of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining “reasonable doubt” as “[t]he 
doubt that prevents one from being firmly convinced of a defendant’s guilt, or the belief that there is a 
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while unlawfully possessing a firearm.16  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit applied a Sixth Amendment analysis in upholding the application of 
the preponderance standard, despite the appellant’s challenge that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the sentencing factor instead be found by 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.17  This case comment argues that the 
“commission of a separate felony” enhancement factor is distinguishable from all 
other U.S.S.G. enhancement factors because it is equivalent to a finding of guilt for 
the commission of a crime.  Therefore, this particular enhancement should require 
the evidentiary standard constitutionally mandated for proving the commission of a 
crime.  The Grier court’s imposition of an enhanced sentence, based on a 
preponderance of the evidence that the appellant committed a felony separate from 
the crime for which he was convicted, was therefore a violation of the appellant’s 
Fifth Amendment right to the due process of law.18
 Sean Michael Grier’s legal troubles began with a dispute over a cable bill.19 
Grier’s girlfriend was holding a bike belonging to her brother Juan Navarro as security 
for his outstanding cable tab.20  This angered Navarro, who approached Grier outside 
of Grier’s girlfriend’s home and demanded his bike be returned.21  When Grier 
refused, Navarro threatened him.22  Grier, however, continued to refuse to return the 
bike and, despite warnings from onlookers that Grier had a gun, Navarro swung at 
real possibility that a defendant is not guilty”) (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 
295, 320 (1850) (Shaw, J.) (“Reasonable doubt . . . is a term often used, probably pretty well understood, 
but not easily defined.  It is not a mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, 
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the 
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors 
in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth 
of the charge.”)).
16. Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.  The district court identified the “separate offense” as being aggravated assault a 
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a) which states:
   A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life . . .
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon . . . .
 Id. at n.2.
17. Id. at 561.
18. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the 
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged.”).
19. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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him.23  Although Navarro missed Grier initially, the failed punch was enough to 
initiate a brawl and the two men quickly tumbled to the ground engaging in a 
physical struggle.24  A shot was fired during the altercation, at which point the two 
men separated unharmed.25  Upon separating, Grier pointed the gun at Navarro.26 
Navarro responded by trying to charge Grier, but in a scene resembling that of a 
Shakespearean tragedy, he was held back by members of the crowd.27  Grier then 
fired a second shot into the air dispersing the crowd, again injuring no one.28  Navarro 
and Grier f led the scene, and Grier dumped the gun into a trash can as he f led.29
 Following the incident, local police initiated an investigation that eventually led 
to the discovery of the discarded gun.30  Upon running a check on the weapon, the 
police learned that it had been stolen.31  Grier was then arrested by local authorities 
for aggravated assault, receiving stolen property, and unlawful possession of a 
firearm.32  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dismissed all three counts in August 
2003.33  Shortly thereafter, Grier was indicted on the federal charge of possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon, to which he pled guilty.34
 As is customary in preparation for a federal conviction,35 the Department of 
Corrections issued a presentence report (“PSR”).36  The PSR suggested the court 
impose a four-level enhancement37 to Grier’s sentence for his use of a firearm in 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.  It is unknown why the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dropped the state charges against Grier.
34. Id.
35. Susan M. Kole, Annotation, Right of Convicted Defendant or Prosecution to Receive Updated Presentence 
Report at Sentencing Proceedings, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 660 (1994).
   In the federal system, under Federal [Rule 32(c)(1)], the probation service of the court is 
directed to make a presentence report for all offenders . . . .  Federal [Rule 32(c)(1)], 
specifically provides that the probation office “shall” make a presentence investigation and 
report to the court before a defendant is sentenced, unless the court finds that there is 
sufficient information in the record to enable meaningful exercise of sentencing authority 
and this finding is explained on the record. The determination that there is sufficient 
information in the record must be made before sentence is imposed.
 Id.
36. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.
37. Federal sentencing recommendations assess a sentence range based on the “applicable category of offense 
committed by the applicable category of defendant.”  21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 872 (2000).  The 
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“connection with another felony offense,” pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)(6).38  The 
report detailed the other “felony offense” as felony assault under Pennsylvania law.39 
While the four-level sentence enhancement did not exceed the federal statutory 
maximum sentence associated with a violation of the crime for which Grier was 
convicted,40 it exposed him to a fifty percent increase in recommended jail time.41 
The district court adopted the PSR and applied the four-level enhancement.42  Grier 
objected to the enhancement and a sentencing hearing was held to determine the 
validity of his objection.43
 At the sentencing hearing before the district court, both parties argued over the 
government’s burden of persuasion in proving the facts necessary to establish grounds 
for the enhancement.44  While it is customary to apply the preponderance standard 
in finding the existence of facts relevant to sentencing,45 the defense argued that the 
particular sentencing factor at issue—that of the commission of another felony 
offense—requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.46  The court adopted the 
government’s position that the preponderance standard should govern.47
 The government’s only evidence in support of its contention that Grier used the 
gun in commission of another felony was the testimony of Juan Navarro, the instigator 
of the assault at issue.48  Navarro testified that he never saw Grier pull the gun from 
his clothing, and that the gun may have just fallen out of Grier’s pockets at some 
point during the fight.49  The defense then stated that even if Grier had pulled the 
gun on Navarro, he would have been acting in self-defense, as Navarro instigated the 
court may then enhance the sentence, or depart from the range, based on findings of sentencing factors. 
Id.
38. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.  The enhancement is currently codified under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6).  See supra 
note 13.
39. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559–60 (citing 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)).
40. The statutory maximum associated with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is a prison sentence of ten 
years.  Id.
41. Without the four-level separate offense enhancement Grier’s recommended imprisonment range would 
have been 84 to 105 months.  With the four-level enhancement, Grier’s recommended imprisonment 
range was between 120 to 160 months.  See id. at 560.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 561 (“Under an advisory Guidelines scheme, district courts should continue to make factual 
findings by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .”).
46. Id. at 560; see also Brief of Appellant at 11, United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. May 11, 2005) 
(No. 05-1698).  The district court imposed the enhancement based on facts that it found using the 
preponderance of evidence standard instead of the required beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  Brief 
of Appellant, Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (No. 05-1698).
47. Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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fight.50  As self-defense is a complete defense to aggravated assault, Grier argued that 
he could not be found to have committed the additional felony offense necessary to 
warrant the four-level enhancement.51  Grier further argued that even if the court 
did not find that he had acted in self-defense, under Pennsylvania law he still had 
not committed the felony of aggravated assault but merely “simple assault by mutual 
consent.”52  Simple assault under Pennsylvania law is categorized as a misdemeanor 
and punishable by no more than a year in prison.53  The offense, therefore, does not 
trigger the enhancement under the U.S.S.G.54  Nevertheless, the court, in applying 
the preponderance standard, adopted the recommendations laid out in the PSR and 
applied the four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5).55  Grier was sentenced 
to 100 months in prison.56
 This decision was appealed, but before analyzing the court of appeals decision, it 
is necessary to give some context for a discussion of the evidentiary burden of proof 
50. Id.
51. Brief of Appellant, supra note 46, at 7 (“Grier argued . . . that he acted in self-defense, which is a 
complete defense . . . .”).
52. Grier, 475 F.3d at 560 n.3 (citing 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2701).  Pennsylvania law defines simple assault 
as:
   a) Offense defined.  A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; [or]
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily  
injury . . . .
(b) Grading.-Simple assault is a misdemeanor of the second degree unless committed . . . 
in a fight or scuff le entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a misdemeanor of 
the third degree . . . .
 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701.  This is opposed to aggravated assault, which is defined as an attempt: “(1) 
to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; [or] (4) [an] attempt[s] 
to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon . . . .”  18 Pa. 
Cons.Stat. § 2702(a)).  It is worth noting that this particular issue is still unresolved.  Upon further 
appeal, the Third Circuit remanded the issue of whether the assault enhancement was correctly applied 
based on an incomplete record in support of a finding of the commission of aggravated rather than 
simple assault.  See United States v. Grier, No. 07-4671, 2008 WL 5114621 (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2008). 
While the sentence may be reduced pending the outcome of this case, the issue of which evidentiary 
burden is appropriate has been fully resolved by the court.  Id.
53. Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.
54. Brief of Appellant, supra note 46, at 8.  A “felony” for the purpose of a Section 2K2.1(b)(5) four-level 
enhancement is a crime with a term of imprisonment that exceeds one year.  Id.  A felony offense is “any 
offense (federal, state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether or 
not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained.”  Id. (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 2K1.3 app. 4  (2007)).
55. Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.
56. The court’s final sentence included a two-level downward departure as a result of the victim Juan 
Navarro’s partial responsibility for the assault that served as the basis for the four-level enhancement. 
Id. at 560.
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required in proving the existence of sentencing factors.  The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area is muddled and contradictory.57  Over the course of the 
past century the Court has spawned two schools of thought on evidentiary burdens 
required at sentencing.  For the purposes of this comment, these two lines of cases 
will be referred to as the Apprendi line and the McMillan line.  The Apprendi line of 
cases focuses on the effect constitutional safeguards have on the criminal defendant, 
as opposed to the McMillan line of cases, which takes a more formalistic approach to 
allocating burdens of proof and gives great deference to state legislatures.  Apprendi 
v. New Jersey and its progeny have repeatedly held that defendants are entitled to jury 
findings by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of any fact which exposes them 
to sentences exceeding statutory maximums.58  In contrast, the McMillan line of 
cases has given states leeway in redefining elements of crimes as sentencing factors, 
in what can be described as an attempt to avoid granting constitutional safeguards to 
criminal defendants.59
 The current prevailing rule, which follows the Apprendi line of cases, is that as 
long as the finding of sentencing factors does not increase the defendant’s sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum associated with the defendant’s conviction, a court 
may make its finding of said factors by the application of a lower evidentiary standard 
57. Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 
(1975), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1997), and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 
81 (1986).
58. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (clarifying the rule set forth in Apprendi by 
holding: “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
solely on the basis of the facts ref lected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”); Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 490 (holding that, in determining whether New Jersey’s hate crime statute, which allowed the 
sentencing judge to double the sentence range based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant committed the crime with bias towards a particular race, violated the Constitution, 
any fact that increases the maximum penalty to which the defendant is exposed must be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt to a jury); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326–27 (1985) (extending the ideals of 
Winship to the presumption of innocence by holding it impermissible for the state to legislatively create 
mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant for elements of the 
offense); Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704 (holding, in striking down Maine’s murder statute, which put the 
burden on the defendant to disprove the element that distinguished murder from the lesser crime of 
manslaughter, that “the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt . . . the mens rea component of the crime of murder”); Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there 
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold 
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
59. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (holding that the state’s designation of “visible possession of a firearm” as an 
enhancement rather than an element of a crime was constitutionally permissible as it did not raise the 
ceiling of the defendant’s potential sentence, but merely raised the f loor if the fact was found by a 
preponderance of the evidence by a sentencing judge); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207–08 (holding, by taking 
a formalistic approach, that the New York legislature’s decision to place the burden on the defendant to 
prove extreme emotional disturbance in order to mitigate murder to manslaughter was constitutionally 
permissible, even though it was essentially the inverse to the Mullaney decision); Leland, 343 U.S. at 800 
(upholding the state’s decision to require defendants to prove the defense of insanity beyond a reasonable 
doubt because sanity hearings were collateral to criminal proceedings).
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than would otherwise be necessary to prove guilt.60  This comment argues that the 
“commission of a separate felony” enhancement factor is equivalent to a finding of 
guilt for the commission of a crime, and therefore should require proof by the 
evidentiary standard constitutionally mandated for proving all other elements of 
crimes charged, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt.61
 On Grier’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
issued a two-to-one decision affirming the district court’s legal findings.62  Grier 
then petitioned for, and was granted, a rehearing en banc.63  On February 5, 2007, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, issued its 
opinion, which affirmed the district court’s holding that the preponderance standard 
is appropriate for the finding of sentencing enhancements that do not increase 
statutory maximums,64 including its finding that Grier committed a crime separate 
from the one for which he was charged.65  The Supreme Court of the United States 
denied certiorari.66
 The Third Circuit held that the Due Process Clause does not require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of “facts relevant to enhancements under the U.S.S.G., 
particularly those that constitute a ‘separate offense’ under governing law,” unless a 
finding of such facts would expose a defendant to a punishment exceeding the 
statutory maximum.67  To support its holding, the court adopted the analysis set 
forth in United States v. Booker.68  Booker presented the issue of whether imposing an 
enhanced sentence in accordance with the U.S.S.G.69 violated the petitioners’70 Sixth 
60. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“[A]ny fact that increases penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
61. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the 
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged.”).
62. Grier’s appeal was originally argued on October 25, 2005, before three judges on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  Following the death of one of the original three judges, the 
quorum was reconstituted so that a holding could be issued.  Grier, 475 F.3d 556, vacated, 453 F.3d 554 
(3d Cir. 2006).
63. Grier, 453 F.3d at 554.
64. Grier, 475 F.3d at 572.  While the court affirmed the lower court’s legal conclusions, the case was 
remanded so that the district court could “explain its decision on the record, specifically by reference to 
the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and further elaboration on its findings regarding the factual 
underpinnings of the assault enhancement.”  Id.
65. Id. at 561.
66. Grier v. United States, 76 U.S.L.W. 3159 (2007) (denying certiorari).
67. Grier, 475 F.3d at 561–62.
68. Id.
69. Prior to Booker, the U.S.S.G. were still mandatory under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  Booker, 
543 U.S. at 227.
70. The appeal was heard on behalf of two petitioners: Freddie J. Booker and Ducan Fanfan.    
Id. at 220.
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Amendment rights.71  The Court in Booker cited its holdings in Blakely72 and 
Apprendi73 to support its holding that in order to protect a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, any fact that exposes a defendant to a sentence that 
exceeds the statutory maximum must be found by a jury.74  As Grier’s sentence did 
not exceed the statutory maximum associated with the offense to which he plead 
guilty, the protections implicated in Booker, as well as in Apprendi and Blakely, were 
not triggered by the issue presented in Grier.75
 While the Court in Booker conducted a thorough analysis of whether the 
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated, it never reached the issue of 
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the separate offense sentencing factor.76  And yet the court in 
Grier held that “the discussion in Booker, regarding the Jury Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment applies with equal force to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”77  The Grier court justified using a Sixth Amendment analysis for a 
Fifth Amendment issue based on an unsubstantiated finding that the two amendments 
are similar.78
71. Id. at 226.  Booker was tried by a jury of his peers and found guilty of “possessing at least fifty grams of 
crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) based on evidence” presented at trial.  Id. at 235. 
Based on the facts found by the jury as well as the offense category of the crime and Booker’s criminal 
history, Booker was exposed to a sentence of 210–265 months.  Id.  However, the sentencing judge 
imposed a sentence of 360 months based on his own factual findings never presented to the jury.  Id.
72. In Blakely, the statute defining the crime committed by the defendant allowed for a sentence of up to ten 
years imprisonment.  Based on the facts proven to the jury, the defendant’s sentence was capped at fifty-
three months.  However after making additional findings, the sentencing judge added three years to the 
fifty-three month maximum.  The Court held the three year increase to be a violation of the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights and clarified the rule set forth in Apprendi by holding that “the ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis in 
original).
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
74. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44.  (“All of the foregoing supports our conclusion that our holding in Blakely 
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.  We recognize, as we did in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely, that in 
some cases jury fact-finding may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants.  But 
the interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial—a common-law right that 
defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—has always 
outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”).
75. Grier, 475 F.3d at 561 (“The primary issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause requires facts 
relevant to enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, particularly those that 
constitute a ‘separate offense’ under governing law, to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
76. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226 (“The question presented in each of these cases is whether an application of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.”).
77. Grier, 475 F.3d at 561.
78. Id. (“The constitutional guarantees of ‘trial . . . by an impartial jury,’ U.S. Const. amend. VI, and ‘due 
process of law,’ U.S. Const. amend. V, stand as a bulwark of individual liberty.  They interpose between 
the legislature and the court the community’s own judgment as to the existence of a crime.”); see also 
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 In her concurring opinion, Judge Ambro criticized the majority’s contention that 
“the Supreme Court’s Apprendi line of cases, culminating at the federal level with 
Booker, dictates the answer to the question presented here.”79  She believed that the 
majority’s application of a Sixth Amendment analysis to a Fifth Amendment issue 
was “too sweeping.”80  Instead, she would have had the court apply the Fifth 
Amendment standard set forth in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.81  Judge Ambro wrote 
that “McMillan, unlike Booker, provides the most complete answer to the question 
presented here.”82  In her opinion, McMillan stands for the proposition that the Due 
Process Clause protects the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of “some facts below 
the statutory maximum, even if the Sixth Amendment (pursuant to Apprendi) does 
not.”83  Although Judge Ambro disapproved of the majority’s analysis,84 as well as its 
acquiescence to a federal practice that imprisons individuals such as the appellant, in 
part for crimes for which they were “never indicted, never tried, and never convicted,”85 
Judge Ambro unfortunately did not find that the facts at issue in the present case 
were among the protected factors under the McMillan standard and ultimately 
concurred with the majority’s opinion.86
 Judge Sloviter, in a dissenting opinion joined by Judge McKee, found that the 
majority’s holding “abrogates one of the most important, if not the most important, 
of the rights that the Constitution affords criminal defendants: the right to be found 
guilty only by a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.”87  Judge Sloviter further criticized 
the holding as being “without any support or precedent,”88 attacking not only the 
majority’s “expansive interpretation of the language in the Booker opinion,”89 but also 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (characterizing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Jury 
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment as “associated” provisions).
79. Grier, 475 F.3d at 575 (Ambro, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 577.
81. Id. at 578–80 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88 (“The statute gives no impression of having been tailored 
to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”)) 
(discussing the three considerations of McMillan which have been distilled into the single metaphorical 
standard which bars the use of a lower evidentiary standard in finding enhancement factors when the 
finding of such factors is akin to “a tail which wags the dog”).
82. Id. at 577 (Ambro, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 573 (finding that while “[t]his practice may be efficient . . . it is not consistent with our Bill of 
Rights”).
86. Id. at 583.
87. Id. at 589 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 591.
89. Id. at 589 (“Neither of the Supreme Court’s Booker decisions discussed the Fifth Amendment nor did 
they suggest that it had no role in sentencing.”).
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its reliance on the commentary to section 6A1.3 of the U.S.S.G. as support.90  Judge 
Sloviter wrote:
The majority’s statement that its adoption of the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard “is suggested by the Guidelines,” its first purported 
authority, is just f lat out wrong.  There is no Sentencing Guideline that 
addresses the issue of the standard of proof in a criminal case.  Indeed, that 
would be beyond the authority granted to the Sentencing Commission.91
Finding no authority for the majority’s holding, Judge Sloviter held that the Due 
Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the finding of the 
separate offense sentencing enhancement.92 
 However, although he criticized the majority for supporting its conclusion with 
cases addressing Sixth Amendment challenges,93 Judge Sloviter falls into the same 
trap as the majority in his own analysis.  The dissent relies on cases such as 
Cunningham v. California,94 Apprendi,95 and even Booker96 to support its conclusion 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a heightened burden 
of proof in establishing the separate offense enhancement factor.97  While these cases 
do focus on the effect of depriving criminal defendants of certain constitutional 
rights, they do not address Fifth Amendment challenges specifically.
 While the dissent98 reaches what this comment argues to be the correct 
conclusion, it fails to apply the correct analysis.  The dissent, like the majority, 
applied a Sixth Amendment analysis to a Fifth Amendment issue.  The concurring 
90. Id. at 591.
91. Id. at 592.  This is not the first time the commentary to section 6A1.3 has come under scrutiny.  See, 
e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 319 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The commentary to § 6A1.3 states that the 
Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate . . . .  The 
Court’s holding today corrects this mistaken belief.  The Fifth Amendment requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . .”); Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 
43 Hous. L. Rev. 341, 387 (2006) (“[T]hough the commentary to Guidelines’ § 6A1.3 states that the 
Commission ‘believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate’ . . . in 
resolving factual disputes, this provision is overdue for reexamination in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.”).
92. Id. at 593 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (“Grier’s guilty plea to one offense (for which he would have been 
entitled to the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard) cannot justify diminution of the applicable standard 
of proof applied by a judge for a separate offense.”).
93. Id. at 589.
94. 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007) (“The question presented is whether the DSL [California’s determinate 
sentencing law], by placing sentence-elevating fact-finding within the judge’s province, violates a 
defendant’s right to trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  We hold that 
it does.”).
95. See, e.g., Aprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
96. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234–44.
97. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 588–604 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
98. Judge McKee, in a separate dissenting opinion to which Judge Sloviter joined, also falls into the trap of 
applying Sixth Amendment precedent to a Fifth Amendment issue.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 604–21 
(McKee, J., dissenting).
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opinion of Judge Ambro correctly advocates for the application of a separate analysis 
for a Fifth Amendment issue, but misapplies the appropriate Fifth Amendment test, 
and thus reaches the wrong conclusion.  To correctly resolve the issue presented in 
Grier—that of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires 
that the separate offense sentence enhancement factor be found by the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard—the Third Circuit should have applied the Supreme 
Court’s only articulated Fifth Amendment analysis related to this issue: that which 
was presented in McMillan.  McMillan provides the analytical guidance necessary to 
correctly decide the Fifth Amendment issue presented in Grier.  The Court in 
McMillan expressly stated that it did not, and could not, create a bright line rule for 
determining which sentencing factors allow a preponderance standard and which 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comport with due process.  The 
Court did offer some guidance, however, by pointing to several factors which, if 
satisfied, could trigger a heightened evidentiary standard.99  Had the court in Grier 
applied the Fifth Amendment standard set forth in McMillan, it would have found 
that the commission of a separate offense as a sentence enhancement factor requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comport with the Due Process Clause.
 The Court’s discussion in McMillan suggested that a heightened evidentiary 
burden would be required by the Due Process Clause if a sentencing factor was “a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”100  Although this metaphor may be 
ambiguous on its face, the Court outlined several circumstances that illustrate the 
standard it created.101  For example, if the sentencing factor effectively “discard[s] the 
presumption of innocence” or “reliev[es] the prosecution of its burden of proving 
guilt,” then the factor would need proof by an evidentiary standard higher than the 
preponderance standard.102  The Court also created a possible exception to its use of 
the preponderance standard for sentencing factors which “alter[ ] the maximum 
penalty for the crime committed[ ]or create[ ] a separate offense calling for a separate 
penalty.”103  Finally, the Court reserved another possible exception to the 
preponderance standard when the sentencing factor could be construed as an attempt 
“to evade the commands of Winship.”104
 McMillan recognized a distinction between the rights protected under the Fifth 
Amendment and those provided by the Sixth Amendment that the court in Grier 
99. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91 (“Our inability to lay down any ‘bright line’ test may leave the constitutionality 
of statutes more like those in Mullaney and Specht than is the Pennsylvania statute to depend on 
differences of degree, but the law is full of situations in which differences of degree produce different 
results.”).
100. Id. at 88; see also Grier, 475 F.3d at 580 (Ambro, J., concurring).
101. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88; Grier, 475 F.3d at 580 (Ambro, J., concurring).
102. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86–87.
103. Id. at 87–88.
104. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
668
UNITED STATES V. GRIER
failed to see.105  In so doing, the Grier court failed to recognize the significant 
difference between a Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis, mainly that “McMillan 
provided caveats to its general Fifth Amendment rule—caveats which the Apprendi 
line does not create in the Sixth Amendment context,”106 and caveats that trigger the 
use of a higher evidentiary standard in a variety of sentencing hearings.107  This is a 
mistake.  The caveats set forth in McMillan protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
rights to the due process of law, a right different from those protected under the 
Sixth Amendment.
 The Supreme Court has expressly refused to overrule McMillan,108 arguably 
because it provides the Court’s only articulated Fifth Amendment standard on the 
burden of persuasion necessary for proving the existence of facts pertaining to 
sentencing.109  While McMillan states that the preponderance standard is generally 
acceptable, it sets out factors that, when satisfied, provide an exception to the general 
rule and trigger the need for a heightened evidentiary standard.110  The court’s 
consideration in Grier of whether the appellant committed a crime separate from the 
one for which he was charged for the purposes of determining sentencing met three 
of the requirements necessary under McMillan to satisfy an exception to the Court’s 
general preponderance rule, thereby requiring a heightened evidentiary standard. 
105. The court in Grier applied the bright line rule set forth in Apprendi.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 578–79 
(Ambro, J., concurring); see also supra note 73 (noting that Apprendi’s beyond a reasonable doubt 
requirement is only implicated in situations where the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory 
maximum).
106. Grier, 475 F.3d at 578–79 (Ambro, J., concurring).
107. Many courts have applied the “tail that wags the dog” standard articulated in McMillan.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 642–45 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring the finding of an 
uncharged kidnapping be found by clear and convincing evidence when the finding would result in a 
nine-level enhancement under the U.S.S.G., increasing the sentencing range from 31–27 months to 
57–71 months (citing United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659–60 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting 
Kikumura)); United States v. Paster, 173 F.3d 206, 216–17 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the government, 
in seeking a nine-level departure from the sentencing range prescribed by the U.S.S.G., conceded that 
it should prove all necessary sentencing factors by a clear and convincing standard); United States v. 
Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287–89 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence of all 
factors relevant to the seven-fold increase to the fine calculated under the U.S.S.G. as sought by the 
government); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the magnitude of 
the contemplated departure [from the range prescribed by the U.S.S.G] is sufficiently great that the 
sentencing hearing can fairly be characterized as a ‘tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense’ 
[then] . . . the factfinding underlying that departure must be established at least by clear and convincing 
evidence.”).
108. Grier, 475 F.3d at 578 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“Apprendi and Harris made clear that McMillan still sets 
out the Fifth Amendment rule applicable to the burden of proof for sentencing factors.”); Harris v. 
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550, 568 (2002) (reaffirming Winship after considering “whether Winship 
stands after Apprendi.”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 (“We limit [McMillan’s] holding to cases that do not 
involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established 
by the jury’s verdict—a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.”).
109. Grier, 475 F.3d at 578 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker that solve the due 
process question here, as suggested by the majority.  Instead, it is McMillan.”).
110. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
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The “commission of a separate offense” enhancement factor111 requires proof by an 
evidentiary standard higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard because 
it has the effect of “relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt,”112 
“create[es] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty,”113 and most importantly 
could be construed as an attempt on the part of the government “to evade the 
commands of Winship.”114
 The facts in Grier clearly establish the existence of the first two McMillan factors. 
By proving the existence of the separate offense enhancement to the sentencing judge 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the government was relieved of its burden to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Grier had committed the crime of aggravated 
assault.115  Furthermore, the government was able to effectively punish Grier for 
conduct associated with a separate crime.116  This point was best articulated by Judge 
Ambro in her concurrence:
[I]f our society, through its law, deems a certain fact worth punishing (or 
warranting additional punishment), then the Constitution commands certain 
procedural protections attending the finding of that fact.  Rather than 
following this principle of fundamental fairness, however, our law—through 
use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—criminalizes activity “on the 
cheap.”  Despite Apprendi and its progeny, we continue to allow sentencing 
judges, once a jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has 
committed one crime, then to find him guilty by a preponderance of the 
evidence of other crimes for which he was not tried—or worse, tried and 
acquitted—and to sentence him as if he had been convicted of them as well.  
In effect, we have a shadow criminal code under which, for certain suspected 
offenses, a defendant receives few of the trial protections mandated by the 
Constitution.117
 Satisfying the third McMillan factor—that of an attempt on the part of the 
government to “evade the commands of Winship”118—is somewhat more complicated. 
The Court in Winship confirmed that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was 
not merely a constitutional assumption, but rather a constitutional requirement under 
the Due Process Clause,119 and therefore extended the requirement not only to all 
111. See supra note 13.
112. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86–87.
113. Id. at 87–88.  The government never has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 
committed the crime of aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat § 2702(a).
114. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
115. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.  Grier had been charged with aggravated assault by Pennsylvania authorities, 
but for reasons not indicated in the record, those charges were dropped.  Id.
116. Id. at 574 (Ambro, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89.
119. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
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facts necessary to constitute the crime charged, but also to all factors that would have 
the same effect on a defendant’s liberty and societal reputation as those of a criminal 
conviction.120  In other words, the finding of any factor that would increase a 
defendant’s loss of liberty or negatively stigmatize an individual in a way that is 
similar to the stigmatization associated with a criminal conviction should comport 
with the requirements necessary to ensure the due process of law—including the 
right to have the aforementioned factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.121
 The Court’s due process concerns in Winship apply with even greater force to the 
sentencing factor found by a preponderance of the evidence in Grier.  While affirming 
the district court’s finding that the appellant in Grier committed aggravated assault 
under Pennsylvania law did not expose him to a prison sentence that exceeded the 
statutory maximum (and thus comported with Apprendi),122 the finding impacted his 
loss of liberty123 and carried with it the same stigmatization as an aggravated assault 
conviction.  The separate offense sentence enhancement gave the court the 
opportunity to make a determination that the defendant was guilty of aggravated 
assault based on a preponderance of the evidence, whereas the same determination 
would have required guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had the appellant been charged 
with aggravated assault.124  In Winship, Justice Harlan made a similar observation
about the juvenile delinquency determination at issue in that case and found 
that a statute that permits a determination of juvenile delinquency, founded 
on a charge of criminal conduct, to be made on a standard of proof that is less 
rigorous than that which would obtain had the accused been tried for the 
same conduct in an ordinary criminal case . . . offends the requirement of 
fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause . . . .125
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 
he is charged.”).
120. Id. at 366–68.
121. Id. at 363–64.  The Court in Winship stated that:
   The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, 
both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of 
the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.  Accordingly, a society that 
values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for 
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
 Id.
122. Supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
123. The four-level enhancement increased the recommended prison sentence by fifty percent.  Grier, 475 
F.3d at 560.
124. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 593 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (“Although Grier pled guilty to possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon . . . no jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, a different and independent 
offense.  Grier’s guilty plea to one offense . . . cannot justify diminution of the applicable standard of 
proof applied by a judge for a separate offense.”).
125. Winship, 397 U.S. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Although Justice Harlan’s finding was made on the grounds that the statute at issue 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conclusion is 
certainly applicable under the Fifth Amendment to the parallel circumstances 
presented in Grier.
 The separate offense sentence enhancement found by a preponderance of the 
evidence in Grier exposed the appellant to punishment for a crime for which he was 
never convicted.126  The separate offense enhancement thus relieved the prosecution 
of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Grier was guilty of aggravated 
assault.  The separate offense enhancement also met the second factor necessary to 
create an exception under McMillan, warranting the use of the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard,127 in that it allowed the court to punish Grier for a separate crime 
defined by the legislature of Pennsylvania without convicting him of that second 
crime.  The separate offense enhancement also triggers the third exception described 
in McMillan, in that it is an attempt by the legislature to “evade the commands of 
Winship.”128  The commands of Winship serve to safeguard the due process rights of 
criminal defendants when liberty and stigmatization are at stake, as they were for 
Grier.129  Sentencing factors that satisfy exceptions under McMillan require a 
heightened evidentiary standard130 and the dual aims of Winship require the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.131  It follows that in order to comport with due 
process under the Fifth Amendment, the finding of the commission of a separate 
offense as grounds for an enhancement to Grier’s sentence should have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
126. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 574 (Ambro, J., concurring).
127. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87–88.
128. Id. at 89.
129. Winship, 399 U.S. at 363–64.
130. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88; Grier, 475 F.3d at 580 (Ambro, J., concurring).
131. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–68.
